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I. Introduction
The presence of a communist or latter day socialist dictatorship in Cuba since 1959 has
remained a raw nerve in American politics and resulting foreign policy since that time.
The U.S. economic embargo of Cuba as well as American legislated and concomitant
regulatory attempts to extraterritorially extend the effectiveness of this sustained U.S. for-
eign policy choice has, in turn, become and remains a source of tension between the
United States and its otherwise closest trading partners among whom the American policy
choice toward Cuba is not shared. This is particularly true of the United States' still
largest trading partner: Canada. A number of years ago, in the pages of this Section's
journal, I observed:
Canadian-American policy differences over Cuba remain unresolved. However, the
impasse is one our respective governments and international business communities
have managed to live with, notwithstanding clearly conflicting laws between our two
jurisdictions and equally antithetical positions on their appropriate reach. With pro-
fuse apologies to our third North American trading partner, the prevailing Canadian-
American status quo on Cuba may be best viewed as a classic Mexican stand-off.'
* This article is a slightly revised text for remarks at the American Bar Association, International Law
Section Fall Meeting, Canada Committee Co-sponsored Panel: "Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't:
Navigating Conflicting U.S. and Foreign Regulation of Investment and Trade with Cuba," Miami Florida,
October 28, 2009. The author wishes to thank John Boscariol for sharing his insights and analysis of the
Canadian legal position in response to the U.S. embargo of Cuba.
** Partner, Theall Group LLP, Toronto, Canada; Immediate Past Co-Chair, ABA-ILS Canada
Committee, A.B. 1974, LL.B. 1977 (Queen's Univ. at Kingston); LL.M. 1979 (N.Y.U.); S.J.D. 1987 (Hary.
Univ.).
1. H. Scott Fairley, Relating to and Doing Business with Cuba: A Canadian Perspective, 36 Lwt'L. LAW. 1117,
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That was seven years ago. Not too much has changed since then, notwithstanding the
passing of Fidel Castro from power and the ascension of his brother Raul.2 Nevertheless,
I share the conference planners' view that a legal refresher on the business reality of com-
pliance between warring statutes over doing business with Cuba remains both informative
and timely, perhaps no more so than in the hospitably warm, sunny, but sometimes heated
venue of this conference.
II. Canadian Blocking Measures In Context
Back in 1985, the Parliament of Canada enacted the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures
Act.3 At that point in time, Parliament was not focused on U.S. attempts to enjoin Cana-
dian subsidiaries of United States owned or controlled entities from trading with Cuba,
but more generally, in response to the long-arm reach of U.S. antitrust laws in relation,
inter alia, to a typically global investigation of an alleged uranium cartel and various off-
shore activities of Canadian banks.4 In that regard, the new Canadian legislation pur-
ported to "protect Canadian citizens and corporations from measures taken by foreign
governments or foreign tribunals with unacceptable extraterritorial scope."s Thus far, how-
ever, the legislative and regulatory history of FEMA has only engaged the perceived spil-
lover of the U.S. embargo of Cuba into Canada.
The framework of FEMA is four-fold:
1. The Attorney General of Canada is given comprehensive powers to prohibit the
production of documents and business records where the Attorney General had
formed the view that a foreign tribunal was purporting to exercise jurisdiction over
Canadian entities in such a way as to infringe Canadian sovereignty;
2. In similar circumstances and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for
External Affairs (now Foreign Affairs and International Trade), the Attorney Gen-
eral can block enforcement of foreign judicial decrees pursuant to designated for-
eign legislation within Canada;
3. The Attorney General can also invoke "claw-back" provisions allowing Canadian
entities to sue in a Canadian court for the recovery of consequential damages and
costs suffered as a result of legal proceedings abroad pursuant to designated foreign
laws; and
4. Lastly, the Attorney General may also impose notification obligations and non-
compliance orders on Canadian businesses in respect of foreign state measures and
directives deemed to infringe on Canadian trade policy or Canadian sovereignty.6
2. See Paul M. Lalonde & A. Farcas, Still in the Tunnel: The Ongoing Dilemma ofDoing Business with Cuba,
7 CAN. INT'L LAW. 165 (2009).
3. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. 49 (1985).
4. See H. Scott Fairley & John Currie, Projecting Beyond the Boundaries: A Canadian Perspective on the
Double-Edged Sword of Frtraterritorial Acts, in TIULATEIRAL PERSPECTIVES IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IS-
SUES: RELEVANCE OF DoMEsnc LAW AND POLICY 119, 121-24 (M. Young & Yuji Iwasawa eds., 1996)
thereinafter Beyond the Boundaries].
5. Press Release, Government of Canada, Governsment Introduces Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Bill
(May 28, 1984).
6. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act.
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As will be seen from the foregoing, the operative provisions of FEMA are not self-
enforcing, save the penal consequences of non-compliance that FEMA specifies in antici-
pation of focused targets. The only targets to date have been the U.S. embargo of Cuba
under the Trading with the Enemy Act,7 Cuban Democracy Act, 1992,8 and related Cu-
ban Asset Control Regulations (CACRs),9 in place since 1962; and latterly, the even more
notorious Helms-Burton legislation of 1996.10 In response to those emanations of Con-
gressional zeal, Canada put in place FEMA Orders in 1990,11 1992,12 and 1996.13 Amend-
ments to the parent statute followed in 1997, essentially to give those Orders sharper
compliance-related teeth with penalties of comparable weight to those mandated by Con-
gress in enforcing the embargo.14
The FEMA Orders, taken together, seek to both protect Canadian business entities
from U.S. legal and regulatory interference with existing and potential Canada-Cuba busi-
ness, and to punish them for compliance with the U.S. embargo which was viewed, further
to FEMA's declared purpose, as having unacceptable extraterritorial scope.
A. THE 1990 ORDER
The U.S. embargo was not regarded as overly intrusive in Canada so long as it did not
straightjacket Canadian affiliates from direct economic relations with Cuban entities or
third parties dealing with them. Up until 1990, the CACRs had always allowed for either
a general license (until 1975) or at least specific licenses under which foreign affiliates of
United States owned or controlled entities-in CACR terminology, "persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States"' 5 could do business with Cuba without violating the
embargo.16 But in 1990, with the Mack Amendment, Congress purported to eliminate
any exceptions to vindicate the rule by imposing a blanket prohibition on foreign affiliates
of U.S. entities.'7 In anticipation of this political initiative passing into law, Canada put in
place the 1990 Order, which was two pronged: first, it prohibited Canadian affiliates from
complying with the U.S. prohibition; second, it compelled the Canadian affiliates to re-
port to the Attorney General any attempts by U.S. parent companies to apply the prohibi-
tion to Canadian business conduct.'8 As it turned out, the Mack Amendment died with
that session of Congress and the 1990 Order was never tested. 9
7. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1994 & Supp. H1 1998).
8. 22 U.S.C. § 6000 (1992).
9. Cuban Asset Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (2002).
10. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (1996).
11. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, SOR/1990-751 (Can.).
12. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, SOR/1992-584 (Can.).
13. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, SOR/1996-84 (Can.).
14. An Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 1996, S.C., c. 28 (Can.).
15. 31 C.F.R. 515.329.
16. See John Boscariol, The Anatomy of a Cuban P ama Crisis: Reconsidering Blocking Legislation in Response to
Ertraterritorial Trade Measures ofthe United States, 30 LAw & PoL. INr'L Bus. 439, 446-47 (1999) [hereinafter
17. Id. at 447.
18. Id. at 454-55.
19. See id. at 445-48; Beyond the Boundaries, supra note 4, at 124-127.
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B. THE 1992 ORDER
A new Congress completed what it had begun under the Mack Amendment by enacting
the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992,20 sterilizing foreign affiliates of U.S. entities from
doing business with Cuba and, in Canada, the 1992 Order was a prompt reaction to what
was generally regarded in Canada as U.S. extraterritorial action clearly contrary to inter-
national law. From the compliance standpoint, the thorniest element for Canadian busi-
ness, apart from dealing with imperious commands from south of the border as a company
matter, was again the prescribed duty to report, which obliged the Canadian company and
any of its officers who receive such communications regarding extraterritorial measures of
the United States in relation to Cuba from a person in a position to direct or influence the
policies of the Canadian entity to report such communications to the Attorney General. 21
Any such report would also have to be made in appreciation of the corollary prohibition
on compliance and the penalties for offending the prohibition already in place in the par-
ent statute.22
C. THE 1996 ORDER
The clash of Canadian and other foreign policies of engagement with Cuba and the
intransigent U.S. policy of isolation did not resolve and, four years down the road, the
1996 Order sought to reaffirm and improve the effectiveness of the 1992 Order. The
Attorney General's Regulatory Impact Statement characterized the amendments of Janu-
ary 1996 as intended "to [increase the 1992 Order's] scope to make it more responsive to
infringements of Canadian sovereignty and to make it more effective in the light of exper-
iences gained since it was first made." 23 The 1996 Order broadened the definition of
extraterritorial measures of the United States to include not only the CACRs, but also to
any laws, guidelines, enactments, and communications similar thereto intended to impede
trade and commerce between Canada and Cuba. 24 It also provocatively extended notifica-
tion requirements from the company to directors and officers, and further cast compliance
obligations even more widely to company managers and other employees in a position of
authority, exposing these individuals to criminal prosecution and penalties.25 Wqhether
intended or not, the generality of the foregoing made compliance and concomitant com-
fort for private business actors in Canada that much more problematic.
D. THE 1997 AMENDMENTS To FEMA
The United States threw perhaps its most provocative extraterritorial gauntlet of all
with the unprecedented and totally unanticipated enactment of the Helms-Burton Act in
March of 1996.26 This legislation provoked an outpouring of indignation from Canada
20. 22 U.S.C. § 6000.
21. SOR/1992-584 § 3.
22. R.S.C., ch. 49 § 7.
23. SOR/1992-584 (Regulatory Impact Statement).
24. SOR/1996-84 § 2(b).
25. Id. § 5.
26. For a comprehensive Canadian critique, see H. Scott Fairley, Exceeding the Limits of Territorial Bounds:
The Helms-Burton Act, 34 CA. YRBK INW'L L. 161 (1997); and from the United States, Robert L. Muse, The
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and its other major trading partners by moving beyond the parameters of embargo, to
attaching both civil rights of recovery to the concept of "trafficking in confiscated prop-
erty" in Title M of the legislation and to designating those who do so as undesirables
precluded from entering the United States under Title IV.27 The Canadian response at
this juncture, left the 1996 Order intact, but amended FEMA with Bill C-54, introduced
in September of 1996 and proclaimed in force on New Year's Day, 1997.28 The amend-
ments, on the one hand, increased the pain for non-compliance by raising penalties sub-
stantially from previous levels, both by way of indictment and on summary conviction to
maximums of a $1.5 million fine for corporations and five years in prison for an individ-
ual.29 At the same time, however, Canadian companies also got the benefit of broadened
claw-back remedies from Canadian courts that were blocked from enforcement of civil
damages awards from U.S. courts based on the embargo. 30
The foregoing legislated and regulatory status quo has remained essentially in place for
over a decade.
M. Practice And Experience Between Scylla And Charybdis
Cross-border experience of Canadian and American private actors placed between two
clearly conflicting political wills is probably best explained by posing the question: "Who
do you fear most?"
My own experience as a legal adviser to companies from time to time on reporting and
compliance issues in Canada and, in one instance, as an expert witness for a U.S. criminal
defense team in a U.S. federal prosecution for "trading with the enemy" 31 suggests the
appropriateness of a particular metaphor very familiar to Canadians in the context of rela-
tions with our good neighbor to the south-that of the "elephant and the mouse." There
are seldom any miscues as to which role falls to which country, but in fairness to both
sides, the record is somewhat mixed, while at the same time giving credence to the chilling
effect of U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba on its economic relations with other nations.
There is no room here to air the details of particular cases, but I will touch on some of
them. One celebrated instance was the Wal-Mart affair with Cuban-made pajamas. 32
This much publicized clash of wills occurred relatively early on in the wake of Helms-
Burton and barely a month after consequent amendments to FEMA when the story at-
tracted media attention in February of 1997, doubtless explaining much of the incident's
Nationality of Claims Principle of Public International Law and the Helms-Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L &
Com. L. REv. 777 (1996); but see, e.g., Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with
International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434 (1996).
27. See Fairley, supra note 26, at 164-72. To date, President Clinton and his successors, George W. Bush
and Barack Obama, have repeatedly suspended civil rights of action under Title m by written notice to
Congress, renewable every six months, as provided by the Act. See 22 U.S.C. § 6085(b)-(c) (1996). Under
Title IV, the only Canadian company whose executives have been designated as "traffickers" is Sherritt Inter-
national Inc. in respect of its nickel mining operations at Moa Bay and other investments in Cuba, notably oil
and gas.
28. An Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 1996 S.C., c. 28.
29. Id. § 5.
30. Id. § 9.
31. See United States v. Brodie, 174 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
32. See Pyjamas, supra note 16, at 462-464.
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notoriety.33 The offending sleepwear had found its way onto the shelves of Wal-Mart
stores across Canada through independent buying on behalf of the Canadian chain.34
When this fact came to light, Wal-Mart U.S. instructed its Canadian affiliate to withdraw
the product from Wal-Mart shelves, and Wal-Mart Canada dutifully did so in all of its
stores; upon notice of this action, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and Inter-
national Trade and the Department ofJustice descended on the Canadian affiliate and the
pajamas went back on Wal-Mart Canada shelves.35 Wal-Mart protested that its Canadian
affiliate had acted in defiance of its clear instructions to remove the product, while, in
Washington, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administering the
CACRs, indicated it would review Wal-Mart's action and enforce the U.S. embargo
against Cuba. 36 Thereafter, the story disappeared from public view; Wal-Mart U.S. ulti-
mately paid OFAC a fine of $50,000 by way of settlement, with no finding of liability.37
The Wal-Mart saga brought into public view both a process and an exchange of mutu-
ally inconsistent positions, which, in my experience, has happened much more fre-
quently-and less confrontationally-out of the public eye. A Canadian affiliate of a U.S.
entity receives a directive from head office affirming overall corporate policy not to do
business with Cuba. There may not be particular business at stake, but more often than
not, there is; otherwise, nothing would prompt head office to send such a missive, espe-
cially because inter-corporate sensitivities around the embargo have been of such long
standing. In any event, the Canadian affiliate has to inform the Attorney General, and of
course, tell head office it is doing so. And in the case of a particular transaction awaiting
execution-a third party request to supply for example, that the Canadian entity knows is
destined for Cuba-say further that Canadian law specifically precludes them from comply-
ing with the head office directive. Head office, in turn, advises OFAC of the impasse
prescribing the necessary conduct of its Canadian subsidiary. This is the so-called "for-
eign sovereign compulsion defence," and allows the corporate family on both sides of the
border to say to their respective governments that each has done all they can do under the
law applicable to them. This scenario assumes, however, that each government accepts
the message. In many cases, papering this Mexican standoff appropriately appears to have
worked. Nevertheless, such an occurrence also tends to bring on the chilling effect men-
tioned above, where corporate actors, where possible, make choices about future business
and markets to avoid further risk of liability.
Notwithstanding its opposition to the embargo, the Canadian Government does accord
respect to U.S. policy in relation to U.S. goods by controlling the use of Canadian trade
channels as mere conduits for the trans-shipment of U.S. origin goods to prohibited desti-
nations. Under Canada's Export Control List,38 Cuba is one of these where a permit is
required, the issuance of which practical experience suggests is contingent on some evi-
dence of permission from U.S. authorities or that the shipment of the goods in question is
33. See id. at 453, 462-63.
34. Id. at 462.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 463.
37. See Lalonde & Farcas, supra note 2, at 170, 176 n.54.
38. Export Control List SOR/1989-202, Item 5400 (Can.).
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for humanitarian purposes. 39 The situation is different, however, where goods that may
have originated in the United States are further transformed in Canada or elsewhere, to
the extent that, under Canadian law, they are no longer regarded as U.S. origin goods for
purposes of re-export.- Obtaining such a permit, where possible, obviously provides
greater comfort than careful papering by lawyers and faith in the otherwise purely discre-
tionary tolerance of both U.S. and Canadian government officials.
Sometimes, however, nothing works. The most notorious case of Canadian-U.S. policy
differences over Cuba wreaking havoc on corporate actors and individuals remains that of
the Bro-Tech Corporation and its principal officers and directors, including one Canadian
citizen, James Sabzali, prosecuted by the U.S. Justice Department for trading with the
enemy, in violation of the CACRs.41 Ultimately, no one went to prison,42 but that result
was a real possibility, the details of which are well described elsewhere.43 Briefly, the U.S.
parent company came under fire for its business-the manufacture in the United States
and sale into Cuba of ion exchange resins for use in water purification facilities-con-
ducted through its foreign subsidiaries. 4 The other individually named defendants were
U.S. citizens residing in the United States.45 The unfortunate Canadian, Sabzali, engaged
in the impugned conduct set out in seventy-seven counts of the indictment in three dis-
tinct capacities: transactions completed when he was manager of Brotech's Canadian sub-
sidiary, Purolite Canada, while living in southern Ontario between 1992 and 1995 (fifty-
seven counts); further transactions after he had been promoted to the position of North
American Marketing Director of Bro-Tech in 1995, but was still a Canadian resident
(eight counts); and the remainder (thirteen counts) in respect of transactions after he had
become a U.S. resident, having transferred to Bro-Tech's head office in Bala Cynwyd, a
suburb of Philadelphia. 46 Promotion proved to be a decidedly mixed blessing for Mr.
Sabzali, who was convicted on the twenty-one counts falling within the latter two catego-
ries.47 Of those, for present purposes, the most controversial were those convictions sus-
tained while Mr. Sabzali remained a resident of Canada.48 In this regard, both the Bro-
Tech and Sabzali defense teams invoked the compulsion defense based on foreign law,
which the U.S. Federal Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected in a pre-
liminary motion to strike the indictment.49
39. General Export Permit No. 12-United States Origin Goods SOR/1997-107 (Can.); see John Boscariol,
Exposure of Canadians Under the U.S. Trade Embargo of Cuba: The Case of James E. Sabzali, 37 CAN. Bus. LJ.
419, 433-34 (2002) (viz. Canadian Law and U.S. Origin Product). The author is also indebted to Mr. Bos-
cariol for details of his practical experience on the ECL Export Permit issue.
40. ECL Item 5400 provides for export control over all U.S.-originated goods, "other than goods or tech-
nology that have been further processed or manufactured outside the United States so as to result in a sub-
stantial change in value, form or use of the goods or technology or in the production of new goods or
technology." SOR/1989-202.
41. See United States v. Brodie, 268 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
42. Id. (overturning previous jury verdict on procedural grounds).
43. See Lalonde & Farcas, supra note 2, at 171-73.
44. Id. at 171-72.
45. Brodie, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
46. See id. at 297.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 296.
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DistrictJudge McLaughlin began by according significant deference to the fact that the
U.S. Justice Department had preferred the indictment at all, notwithstanding foreign sov-
ereign compulsion going the other way. This was the first case in which the compulsion
defense had been invoked in U.S. courts in the criminal context.50 Thus:
To the extent that the doctrine is based on foreign relations considerations, the fact
that a criminal suit has been brought demonstrates the executive branch's determina-
tion that the injury to the United States from the alleged conduct outweighs the
potential injury to foreign relationships. The Court agrees that if the rationale for
the doctrine is deference to the acts of a foreign sovereign, there is no place for the
doctrine in a criminal case.51
In this regard, the Court also made reference to diplomatic exchanges on point, the
identity of an unindicted co-conspirator who the record identified as Mr. Sabzali's succes-
sor at Purolite Canada, and the fact that the Government of Canada had "never raised any
objection to the prosecution of any other defendant."52
The very existence of FEMA and the FEMA Orders on which I provided affidavit evi-
dence and testified as a defense expert, similarly failed to persuade, as did that of my
counterpart, Professor Christopher Greenwood, for the U.K. equivalent.5 3 First, the
Court viewed the blocking statutes as not compelling trade with Cuba, raising the diffi-
culty of proving the negative: "they prohibit certain persons from not trading with Cuba
only if the decision not to trade with Cuba is because of the CACRs or instructions based
on the CACRs."s4 And then, there was no record of actual prosecution under either the
Canadian or U.K. blocking statutes and the Court emphasized the difficulty of such a task:
"[t]hose governments would have to show that a company or individual did not do busi-
ness with Cuba because of a desire to comply with the CACRs. It would be very difficult
to get evidence of a company's intent in not doing something."55 In contrast thereto,
Judge McLaughlin did not address the presence or absence of a robust record of prosecu-
tion under the embargo aimed at foreign business conduct, subject to such blocking
statutes.
In the end, it is perhaps fair to say that Bro-Tech remained, at bottom, a case concerned
principally with the conduct of an American company, violating the laws of the United
States within U.S. territory. To the extent that the case went beyond those parameters,
however, the foreign sovereign compulsion defense did not resonate for purposes of a
domestic criminal prosecution in the United States. Greater scope may remain in the civil
context.
IV. Concluding Thoughts
The reality of blocking statutes is that they are designed to be difficult. One might go
further and say that, in the result, such laws almost by definition tend not to be clear or
50. Id. at 300.
51. Id.
52. Id. at n. 6.
53. Both affidavits are discussed by McLaughlin J., id. at 298-99.
54. Id. at 301.
55. Id
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precise. The Canadian example generally, and in relation to Cuba as discussed above,
offers no exception to what I suggest might be a general rule. In sum, FEMA emerged as
a visceral political act to the perceived extraterritorial excesses of the United States among
which its embargo of Cuba has been clearly the most offensive to Canada's views of its
own sovereign jurisdiction.
When business actors are caught between the laws and policies of confrontation be-
tween governments, government actors on either side are virtually compelled not to offer
easy or even intelligible answers, at least not in any public way that could undermine the
essential politics of the situation. At the same time, notwithstanding both the sustained
intensity of the U.S. embargo against Cuba, and the sustained objections of the United
States' otherwise closest allies to the embargo's extraterritorial reach, the notorious cases
have been relatively few and far between. Part of that may be ascribed to private sector
prudence and market choice measured against the risks of legal, extending to criminal
liability. One must also acknowledge, however, that the record of enforcement-and the
absence of a large record at that-suggest much public prosecutorial restraint also at work
in deference to the impossibility of individual circumstances and in appreciation of intrac-
table laws designed to be difficult. To conclude, the goal of seeking rational solutions in
the public domain of enacted laws entrenching irreconcilable politics-as they have been
for quite some time as between Canada and the United States with regard to Cuba-may
be a misconceived quest. It calls to mind Don Quixote's "Impossible Dream." We are
exceedingly unlikely to get there.
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